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Abstract
A key feature of recent work on barriers to technology adoption is the assumption
that monopoly rights of insiders are limited by the ability of industry outsiders to
enter. This paper endogenizes the decision of a government to provide barriers to
technology adoption alone or in combination with barriers to entry of outsiders. Using a
political economy model, we find that a government provides barriers to both technology
adoption and outsider entry. If governments are not too “corrupt”, restricting their
ability to provide barriers to entry may eliminate barriers to adoption. However, for
sufficiently “corrupt” governments, prohibiting barriers to entry leads to more extreme
barriers to technology adoption.
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1 Introduction
The possibility that monopoly rights play a significant role in accounting for the large differ-
ences in per capita GDP and total factor productivity (TFP) across countries (see Prescott
(1998)) has received considerable recent attention. This is largely due to important con-
tributions by Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000), who show that monopoly rights acquired
by vested interests can have large effects on productivity. Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005b)
build upon the work of Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000), and show that monopoly rights
arising from barriers to entry could generate large differences in per capita output across
countries.1
A key element of both Parente and Prescott (1999) and the work of Herrendorf and
Teixeira (2005b) is the gap between the productivity of industry insiders and outsiders. In
Parente and Prescott (1999), industry outsiders are assumed to be able to enter an industry,
but are less efficient when operating the existing technology than industry insiders. This
gap plays a key role in generating the incentives for insider groups to acquire barriers to
the adoption of superior technologies. However, in both of these papers, the size of this
productivity gap is viewed as an exogenous parameter.
In this paper, we ask whether barriers to entry emerge as an equilibrium outcome of a
dynamic political economy model of barriers to the adoption of superior technologies. En-
dogenizing the government’s decision to provide entry barriers also allows us to ask whether
restricting the ability of governments to block entry would lead to a reduction in barriers to
technology adoption.
To answer these questions, we analyze a political economy model where barriers to the
adoption of superior technology can be provided with or without barriers to entry of industry
outsiders. The demand for these barriers to entry and adoption comes from industry insiders
who are more experienced and hence more productive than industry insiders in using current
1In related work, Holmes and Schmitz (1995) and Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005a) examine the linkages
between monopoly rights, trade policy, and productivity.
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technology.2 The supply of barriers is provided by a government regulator which is able to
choose between providing barriers only to the adoption of superior technology and providing
barriers both to adoption jointly with barriers to entry.3 This framework also allows us
to examine how barriers to entry influence the dynamic evolution of coalitions of industry
insiders.
The model environment extends Bridgman, Livshits and MacGee (2005) to allow the
government to choose to provide barriers to the adoption of superior technologies with and
without barriers to entry. The production environment has three key elements. First, to
capture the idea that industry insiders (vested interests) are affected asymmetrically by the
adoption of new technology, we assume that workers productivity (skill level) increases via
learning by doing. As a result, older workers are more productive in the technology used
in the previous period than younger workers. Formally, our environment builds upon the
vintage human capital model of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991). Workers are two-period lived
and are skilled when old in the technology they used when young. These skills cannot be
transferred across industries or vintages. Hence, skilled workers have a vested interest in
incumbent technologies, since the adoption of new technology renders their skills obsolete.
As a result, the benefits from the non-adoption of new technology in an industry are highly
concentrated, while the costs are broadly spread among all other workers. Second, as we see
protection arising in both small and large industries, we assume that there are (infinitely)
many industries. This assumption plays a key role in generating the concentrated benefits
and diffused costs of policies favoring specific industries. Finally, we abstract from innova-
tion, and assume that new, more productive vintages become available for adoption in each
industry each period. Our decision to focus on technology adoption rather than innovation
is based on the premise that the large differences in productivity across countries are largely
due to the non-adoption of best practice technologies (Jovanovic (1997)).4
2We abstract from the possibility of inefficient work practices.
3Some common examples of government regulation restricting entry are the allocation of production
quota’s, the assignment of import licenses for critical inputs and government mandated monopolies.
4Differences in adoption exist between developed countries with similar relative factor prices. Bailey and
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The political economy part of the model features (vested) interest groups that lobby the
government for their desired policy. We assume that the only policy dimension in which
the government is active is the decision of whether or not to regulate an industry. The
government can choose between two types of regulation. The first type of regulation consists
of a ban on the adoption of superior technology and a ban on entry by industry outsiders
into the industry. The second type of government regulation involves only a prohibition
on the adoption of new technology, but does not prohibit the entry of industry outsiders
(workers who are not skilled in that technology) from working in the industry. We say that
an industry is protected if the government imposes either of these policies on that industry.
The lobbying game builds upon Grossman and Helpman (1994). The government’s payoff
is a weighted sum of real GDP (a measure of social welfare) and contributions (bribes) from
lobby groups. The government announces which type of regulation it may be willing to
provide in exchange for contributions (bribes). Workers (households) then choose whether
or not to form coalitions to lobby (bribe) the government for regulation. We also assume that
“broad based” lobby groups which oppose protection are unable to exclude non-contributing
members from the benefits of lower protection.
The trade-off facing the government when deciding between providing a barrier to adop-
tion with versus without a barrier to entry is relatively simple. On the one hand, bundling
the barrier to entry with the barrier to adoption provides industry insiders with additional
monopoly rents – which increases their willingness to make larger contributions to the gov-
ernment in return for protection. However, the cost of creating these additional rents is a
larger distortion in relative prices across industries and hence in output. As a result, the
government faces a trade-off between providing relatively non-distortionary barriers to the
adoption of superior technologies to many industries or providing much more distortionary
barriers to a smaller number of industries.
Since the complexity of our model makes it impossible to make general statements, we
Gersback (1995) examine manufacturing industries in the U.S., Germany and Japan and argue that much
of the variation in relative productivities is due to the non-adoption of best practice technologies.
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resort to numerical methods to characterize equilibria. What we find is that the equilibrium
outcome of the political economy game is that governments choose to impose both barriers
to entry and barriers to technology adoption. In effect, the government finds that the higher
contributions (bribes) associated with providing entry barriers and barriers to technology
adoption together justify the reduction in real GDP due to the larger distortions.
Based on this, one might conclude that restricting the ability of governments to limit
entry would reduce the extent and cost of barriers to the technology adoption. We find that
this intuition holds for governments which do not place too high a weight on “bribes” paid by
lobby groups relative to GDP. However, we show via a numerical example that for sufficiently
“bad” (corrupt) governments, a prohibition on entry restrictions can lead to more extreme
barriers to the adoption of superior technologies and much larger deviations in TFP from
the frontier. When the government can bundle barriers to adoption with barriers to entry,
“bad” governments lead to modest levels of short-lived protection. In contrast, when barriers
to entry are prohibited, “bad” governments can generate several periods of non-adoption of
new technologies in all industries. This leads to much larger gaps between the level of TFP
and the world technology frontier than can occur in when barriers to entry are permitted.
Hence, restricting the ability of (“bad”) governments to restrict entry can sometimes lead to
extremely perverse outcomes.
This counter-intuitive result is driven by two underlying forces. First, allowing the entry
of unskilled workers into protected industries limits the distortion in relative prices caused
by protection. This dramatically reduces the cost to the government of protecting a large
fraction of industries. The second underlying force is a dynamic one. Prolonged protection
requires the perpetuation of industry lobby groups across generations. In the monopoly
rights environment, young workers do not work in protected industries, and hence protection
is never demanded by industries more than 1 vintage behind the technology frontier. In
contrast, in the environment without monopoly rights, we find equilibria where young work
in protected industries. This leads to a perpetuation of the industry lobby into the following
period.
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Although much of the intuition about the interaction between political process and vested
interests are discussed in Olson (1982), there have been few attempts to formalize these sto-
ries. In an important contribution, Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996) construct an overlapping
generations model in which agents vote on whether to allow innovation to take place. Bellet-
tini and Ottaviano (2003) modify the political economy framework of Krusell and Rios-Rull
(1996), and examine a lobbying game based on the framework of Grossman and Helpman
(1994). In these papers, the (political) conflict is primarily between generations, as older
skilled workers resist the adoption (innovation) of new technologies that would lower their
productivity while increasing the productivity of the young. However, in Krusell and Rios-
Rull (1996) and Bellettini and Ottaviano (2003), barriers to new technologies arise only
when some workers are rendered less productive by new technologies. Bridgman, Livshits
and MacGee (2005) show that incorporating many small interest groups can, for reasonable
parameter values, generate barriers to technology adoption in equilibrium of a political econ-
omy model of lobbying when all workers are made more productive by the adoption of new
technology.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the model. Section 3
specifies our equilibrium concept. In section 4, we first characterize the equilibria of each of
the two subgames (with and without entry barriers) and then study the government’s choice
of the type of protection. Section 5 discusses the implications of different entry barriers for
political and economic outcomes and examines an illustrative numerical example. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model
The economy is populated by two-period lived overlapping generations households and a
government. There is a continuum of measure one of consumption goods. All variables are
in per capita terms.
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2.1 Technology
There are a continuum of industries of measure one. Each industry produces a distinct
consumption good and takes as inputs unskilled labor l and skilled labor s. Productivity is
determined by the vintage of the technology vt employed at date t. A new vintage, γ > 1
times more productive than the previous, arrives exogenously at the beginning of each period
for each industry. Output of industry i is:
yt(i) = γ
vt(i) (λst (i) + lt (i)) . (1)
Skilled labor is industry and vintage specific, and is λ > 1 times as productive as unskilled
labor. Skill in a particular industry and vintage can only be acquired by working as an
unskilled worker in that industry using that vintage.
2.2 Households
At the beginning of each period t, a continuum of measure (1+n)t of generation t households
is born. Each household lives for two periods and is endowed with one unit of time in each
period. The household inelastically supplies labor to firms and consumes consumption goods
ct(i). Households have identical preferences represented by:
ut(ct) =
∫ 1
0
ln ctt(i)di+ β
∫ 1
0
ln ctt+1(i)di (2)
We assume Cobb-Douglas utility for analytical tractability. Households choose which indus-
try to work in and the quantity of each good to consume.
2.3 Barriers
The government can impose barriers to adoption of a new technology in any industry. The
government can choose to couple this protection from adoption with a barrier to entry of
(unskilled) labor into the industry. The government chooses whether protection will include
a barrier to entry before the lobbying game begins.5
5It turns out that an equivalent (in terms of the resulting equilibria) way of specifying the barrier to
entry is to require that any outsider (unskilled) who works in a protected industry has to pay the same bribe
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2.4 Lobby Groups
Each period, all workers (both skilled and unskilled) can form coalitions to lobby the govern-
ment. Lobbying is an offer of a bribe payment to the government in exchange for enacting
a desired policy. Lobby groups behave non-cooperatively with respect to each other.
A key issue is the ability of coalitions to force individual members to make contributions
towards the bribe payment. Industry specific coalitions can exclude any skilled worker who
fails to pay the bribe from working in that industry. However, if the entry of industry
outsiders into a protected industry is not prohibited, unskilled workers are free to choose to
work in that industry using whatever technology is permitted.
It is worth emphasizing that all workers are free to form coalition(s) to lobby against
industry protection. Such lobbies, however, are unable to exclude members from working in
any industry or punish them in any other fashion for failure to contribute towards the bribe.
2.5 Government
The government consists of a positive measure of agents who cannot provide labor to firms.
The government may provide protection to industries. They choose between two types of
protection. Protection for an industry can either only consist of a ban on the adoption of a
new vintage or also include a prohibition of entry of (unskilled) workers into the protected
industry. A government policy is given by a binary choice χ, which takes value 1 if entry into
protected industries is banned and 0 otherwise, and an integrable function pi : [0, 1]→ {0, 1}
where pi(i) takes the value 1 if industry i is protected and 0, if it is not protected.
The government acts myopically. It has preferences over social welfare and the bribes it
receives. The income received by the government as bribes (B) is used to purchase consump-
tion goods. The government’s preferences over consumption goods are identical to those of
contribution as an industry insider. This suggests that one mechanism that could be used to implement the
barrier to entry is to require that all workers must belong to an industry “union” which collects fees from
all members.
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households. Its objective is:
UG =
Y + φB
P
(3)
where Y is nominal GDP, B is total bribes and P is the price index. The price index P is
given by lnP =
∫ 1
0
ln p(i)di. The parameter φ denotes the venality of the government. Note
that since bribes are included in GDP the parameter φ is the extra weight that government
places on its own consumption. Taking government preferences to be the weighted sum of
real GDP and real bribes (also used by Grossman and Helpman (1994)) provides us with
a tractable way of varying the relative weight the government puts on private gains versus
social welfare.
2.6 Timing
At the beginning of each period, new agents are born and new vintages become available.
The number (density) of skilled workers in industry i, st(i), is the number (density) of old
workers who worked in that industry at t− 1.
The game in each period proceeds as follows. First, the government decides whether it
will let insiders exclude unskilled from working in a protected industry, and announces that
decision. Then, each lobby group simultaneously presents a bribe offer to the government.
The government either accepts or declines each bribe offer. After the policy is announced,
adoption occurs, and people decide where to work. Finally, the government collects bribes
from lobby groups whose industries were protected.
3 Equilibrium
This section defines political economy equilibrium. We begin by defining a competitive
equilibrium for any given outcome of the lobbying game. This determines the payoffs to
agents for any outcome of the lobbying game. We then define our equilibrium concept for
the lobbying game.
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3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
The state of the economy at the beginning of the period is the distribution of vintages v and
the density of skilled workers s. vt(i) denotes the vintage of industry i while st(i) denotes
the (per capita) density of skilled workers in industry i that are skilled in vt(i).
Firms act competitively, and choose inputs and vintages so as to maximize profits, taking
prices and policies as given. If adoption is not prohibited (pit(i) = 0), industry i solves:
max
y,s,l,v′
[pt(i)y − wl,t(i)l − ws,t(i)s] (4)
s.t. y = γv
′
(λs+ l) 0 ≤ v′ ≤ t
where wl,t(i) and ws,t(i) are the wages paid to an unskilled and skilled worker in industry
i, respectively. If the industry is protected (pit(i) = 1), then the firm can no longer choose
whether to adopt. In this case, the last constraint becomes v′ = vt(i). If, in addition, entry
of unskilled into the industry is banned (χ = 1), then firms cannot hire unskilled workers
(l = 0).
Households take the sequence of policies {pit}∞t=0, bribe offers {bt}∞t=0, prices {pt}∞t=0, wages
{(ws,t, wl,t)}∞t=0, and firm’s adoption decisions {v′t}∞t=0 as given. Each period, households
decide in which industry to work. In addition to the aggregate state variables, an old agent’s
state is determined by the industry (i) she is skilled in. The old agent’s value function is
V Ot (pit, bt, wt, pt, i) = max
c
∫ 1
0
ln ct(j) dj (5)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
ct(j)pt(j) dj ≤ max {pit(i) (ws,t(i)− bt(i)) ; wl,t} ,
where wl,t is the highest unskilled wage. If entry into protected industries is allowed (χ = 0),
then wl,t = max
i
wl,t(i); otherwise wl,t = max
pi(i)=0
wl,t(i).
The problem of a young agent is to choose the industry i and {ct(j)}1j=0 to solve:
max
i,c
∫ 1
0
ln ct(j) dj + βEtV
O
t+1 (pit+1, bt+1, wt+1, pt+1, i) (6)
s.t.
∫ 1
0
ct(j)pt(j)dj ≤ wl,t(i).
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The density (number) of old people skilled in industry i who choose to work in i in period
t is denoted σt (i) (σt (i) ≤ st(i)). Similarly, the density (number) of people who choose to
work as unskilled in industry i is ϑt (i). In equilibrium, labor markets clear: ϑt (i) = lt(i)
and σt (i) = st(i). Since the population each period is normalized to one:∫ 1
0
lt (i) di+
∫ 1
0
pit (i) st (i) di = 1 . (7)
Goods markets clear:
∫
ct(i, ω)dω = yt(i) for all i ∈ [0, 1], where ω’s are consumers’ names.
Definition 1 Given sequences of government policy functions {χt, pit}, bribes {bt} and initial
state (s0, v0), a Competitive Equilibrium is sequences of states {st(i), vt(i)}, prices {pt(i)},
wages {ws,t(i), wl,t(i)}, and household allocations {(cτ (ω), iτ (ω))τ=t,t+1} and firm allocations
{lt(i), st(i), yt(i), v′t(i)} such that
1. Given the state, policy, bribes, prices and wages, each household’s allocation solves the
household’s problem.
2. Given policy, state, prices, and wages, each firm’s allocation solves the firm’s problem.
3. Markets clear.
4. The state variables st+1(i) evolve according to the density of young people working in
industry i at time t, and vt+1(i) = v
′
t(i).
3.2 Game between the Government and Industry Insiders
Free rider problems prevent many possible coalitions from making a credible bribe offer.
This follows from their inability to “punish” members who do not contribute towards the
bribe. For this reason, in the game specified below, we do not explicitly model coalitions
other then those of skilled (old) workers in a given industry. These coalitions of industry
insiders are able to exclude non-paying members from working in the industry, which allows
them to overcome the free rider problem.
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Policy and contributions are determined by a game between the government and the
coalitions of industry insiders. In the first stage of the game, the government choose whether
to protection will include a barrier to entry, χ. The choice is made by comparing the value
of the government’s objective in equilibria of the two subgames (with and without the entry
barrier).
In each subgame, coalitions of industry insiders simultaneously select bribe offers to
maximize the expected value of the skill premium, net of bribes, for their members. The
value of protection to a member of lobby group i is the difference between the wage that
workers could earn if adoption of the new vintage in their industry was prohibited and the
wage they could otherwise earn as an unskilled worker:
V pt (i) = ws,t(i)− wl,t (8)
For a given state and schedule of per worker bribes (b(i), bu(i)), each government policy
induces a competitive equilibrium. In turn, each competitive equilibrium generates a price
index P (pi), skilled wages ws(i)(pi), and nominal GDP Y (pi). The total amount of bribes
collected is
B =
∫ 1
0
pi(i) (b(i)s(i) + bu(i)l(i)) di. (9)
In the last stage of the game, the government chooses a which industries to protect,
taking the bribe offers announced by coalitions of industry insiders as given, to maximize its
objective function. Formally, an equilibrium is:
Definition 2 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is strategies (χ∗,Π∗), (B∗i )i∈[0,1] such that
1. For every vector of bribe offers B, the government policy function Π∗(B) solves
V G(B) = max
pi
Y (pi) + φ
∫
pi(i)Bi di
P (pi)
. (10)
2. The bribe function for each coalition of industry insiders, B∗i (s, v), solves
max
Bi
E
[
Π∗i (B
∗
−i, Bi)
(
ws(i)− wl − Bi
s(i)
)]
. (11)
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3. The government choice χ∗ maximizes V G(B∗(χ), χ).
We restrict our attention to Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria. The symmetry re-
striction we impose is that all industries which operated the same vintage in the previous
period have the same number of skilled workers. This implies that industries which operate
the same vintage are identical.
Definition 3 A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is symmetric if along the equilibrium path all
industries of the same vintage are indistinguishable: st(i) = st(j) whenever vt(i) = vt(j).
Restricting attention to symmetric equilibria dramatically reduces the state space. In-
stead of tracking allocations for each industry, we merely track allocations for a finite number
of classes of industries, where each class is indexed by the distance dt(i) = t − vt(i) of the
vintage operated from the most advanced vintage available. The state becomes (s(d), x(d)),
where x(d) is the measure of industries d vintages behind at the beginning of the period.
In a symmetric equilibrium, all coalitions of industry insiders whose skill is d vintages
behind offer the same bribe B(d). The government’s policy is fully specified by the choice
of the subgame, χ, and the measure of industries d vintages behind that are protected
(µ(d) ∈ [0, x(d)]). Since all unprotected industries adopt, µ(0) denotes the measure of
industries not granted protection.
A symmetric equilibrium path is fully specified by the sequences of state variables
{xt, st}∞t=0 and strategies {χt, µt}∞t=0, {Bt}∞t=0. The law of motion of x(d) is:
xt(d) = µt−1(d− 1) ∀d ≥ 1, xt(0) = 0. (12)
st(d) evolves according to the number of young workers who worked in industries d − 1
vintages behind at t − 1. In characterizing equilibria, we specify the distribution of young
workers across industries, and use this to construct st(d). Note that
∑
d=1,2,..
s(d)x(d) = 1
2+n
.
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4 Characterizing Equilibria
We assume that the government makes its announcements on which type of monopoly rights
will be available at the beginning of the period. We present the structure of the equilibria
for each of the two possible subgames below, before characterizing the governments choice
of which subgame to choose in section 4.3.
Before examining the subgames, several general points are worth noting. First, we restrict
attention to symmetric Markov perfect equilibria of the lobbying game. Subgame perfection
implies that an industry lobby will never offer a bribe more than minimally sufficient to
guarantee protection. When not all industries d vintages behind are protected (µ(d) < x(d)),
the government extracts all of the surplus from protection of these industries. This results
from the “Bertrand-type” competition between industries. In this case, the per member
bribe offer equals the value of protection (equation (8)). Note that a lobby knows that its
actions cannot affect the aggregate protection level.
We assume throughout our analysis that γ > λ. In words, we restrict attention to
cases where the new technology strictly dominates the previous vintage. This implies that
unskilled workers using the new vintage are always strictly more productive than a skilled
worker using an older vintage.
4.1 Subgame 1: Barrier to Adoption and Entry
Several classes of dynamic equilibria arise when unskilled workers can not work in a protected
industry. Here, we present two classes of stationary equilibria: Constant Protection Levels
(CPL) and Two-Period Cycles (TPC).6 CPL occurs when the government venality (φ) is
low, with zero protection as a special case. As the government’s venality increases, cycles
arise.
6Our description of these equilibria is deliberately terse, as a more detailed analysis and complete charac-
terization of the set of dynamic equilibria for this subgame can be found in Bridgman, Livshits and MacGee
(2005).
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4.1.1 Static Lobbying Game
To illustrate the workings of the dynamic equilibria, we begin by characterizing the equilib-
rium of the (static) lobbying game in period t, taking the aggregate state (xt(d), st(d)) as
given. We assume that all old workers are skilled in vintage t− 1 (this is always the case in
this environment).
For a given government policy µ (the fraction of industries protected) and lobby contri-
bution b(1) (bribe per worker), it is straightforward to solve for the competitive equilibrium.
We normalize the price of unprotected goods to 1. Since workers are paid their marginal
products, the unskilled wage in unprotected industries is wl,t(d = 0) = γ
t, and the skilled
wage in protected industries is ws,t(1) = γ
t−1λpt(1). Workers are employed either as skilled
workers in a protected industry or as unskilled workers in an unprotected industry.7
The number of unskilled workers in each unprotected industry is
lt(0) =
1− µt(1)st(1)
1− µt(1) (13)
and the price of protected goods is
pt(1) =
γ
λst(1)
lt(0). (14)
We now turn to the payoffs of the lobbying game players. The value of protection to an
old worker is
V pt (1) = ws,t(1)− wl,t(0) = γt
1− st(1)
st(1)(1− µt(1)) (15)
Clearly, skilled workers demand protection only if st(1) < 1. Otherwise, no protection is
the unique equilibrium outcome. When st(1) < 1, protection increases the relative price
of protected goods. Protection also lowers the level of output in protected sectors, while
7As mentioned earlier, an equivalent way to specify the model involves requiring unskilled workers in a
protected industry to pay the same bribe as skilled workers. Using the fact that the unskilled wage in a
protected industry would be wl,t(1) = γt−1pt(1), it is straightforward to verify that unskilled workers do not
want to work in protected industries: wl,t(1) − b(1) ≤ wl,t(0). In most equilibria, the entire surplus from
protection is extracted, ws,t(1) − b(1) = wl,t(0). Since ws,t(1) = λwl,t(1), unskilled workers strictly prefer
working in unprotected industries.
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increasing the output in unprotected industries. This is primarily driven by young workers
being spread across fewer (unprotected) industries.
Taking into account the effects of its policy choice on the competitive equilibrium, the
government chooses µt(1) to maximize:
UG(µt(1)) =
γt
(
1−µt(1)st(1)
1−µt(1)
)
+ φBt(1)µt(1)[
γ
λst(1)
(
1−µt(1)st(1)
1−µt(1)
)]µt(1) . (16)
Protection increases nominal GDP and nominal bribes, but also increases the price index. In
fact, a sufficient condition for real GDP to be decreasing in the level of protection is γ > λ.
Hence, the unique equilibrium for φ = 0 is no protection.
If some industries one vintage behind are not protected in equilibrium, then the govern-
ment extracts all of the surplus from protection. In other words, the contribution of each
industry insider to the bribe equals the value of protection. The bribe offer from each lobby
is the product of the value of protection to each worker and the number of workers:
Bt(1) = V
p
t (1)st(1) =
γt
(1− µt(1)) (1− st(1)) . (17)
If st(1) ≤ ln
(
γ
λst(1)
)
, then the equilibrium of this static game is unique. Furthermore,
there is an open set of parameter values for which not all industries one vintage behind are
protected.
4.1.2 Dynamic Equilibria
The dynamic aspect is the endogeneity of the state variables – the number of old workers
in each industry {st(d)} and the measure of industries d vintages behind {xt(d)}. Since
unskilled workers cannot work in a protected industry have to pay the same bribe, all of
the young work in unprotected industries, and there are no workers skilled in vintages more
than one generation behind the frontier (st(d) = 0 ∀ d > 1). Thus there is no one with
a vested interest in any technology more than 1 vintage behind the frontier. This implies
xt(d) = 0 ∀ d > 2 and µt(1) + µt(0) = 1. Using the law of motion (12), xt(1) = 1− µt−1(1)
and xt(2) = µt−1(1).
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Below we characterize stationary symmetric Markov perfect equilibria. Since young work-
ers spread evenly across unprotected industries,
st(1) =
1
(2 + n)µt−1(0)
=
1
(2 + n)(1− µt−1(1)) . (18)
In equilibrium, old workers who were not granted protection also spread evenly across the
unprotected industries.
4.1.3 Constant Protection Levels
The easiest equilibria to characterize are Constant Protection Levels (CPL). While a con-
stant fraction of industries (less than half) are protected each period, the specific industries
protected vary from period to period. Since µt(1) < 0.5 < xt(1), the equilibrium bribe offers
are equal to the value of protection. While stationary equilibrium may not be unique, the
equilibrium path is pinned down by the initial condition. A special case is zero protection
equilibrium, which occurs when φ ≤ 2+n
1+n
ln
(
(2+n)γ
λ
)
− 1.
4.1.4 Cycles
Cycles are driven by the endogeneity of the state variables. The “size” of vested interest
groups (st(1)) is pinned down by the allocation of young workers in the previous period,
which in turn is determined by the extent of protection in that period (µt−1(1)).
The easiest cycles to characterize are Two-Period Cycles (TPC). They feature periods of
zero protection alternating with periods of extensive, but not complete, protection. Suppose
that all industries adopted in the previous period (xt(1) = 1, st(1) =
1
2+n
). A sufficiently
venal government would then choose to protect a large fraction of industries. If µt(1) ≥
1 − 1
2+n
, then the young are squeezed into so few industries that in the following period
st+1(1) ≥ 1, and hence protection is not demanded (see equation (15)). This leads to a
period of no protection, which confirms our conjectured equilibrium.
While there are other types of stationary equilibria (discussed in Bridgman, Livshits and
MacGee [2005]), none of them features a period of full protection. Regardless of the initial
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conditions (state variables), even the most venal government will never want to protect
all industries. As the fraction of industries protected approaches one, roughly half of the
population (all of the young) are crammed into the vanishing set of unprotected industries.
This drives the price of unprotected goods relative to protected goods to zero. In effect, the
young’s contribution to real GDP goes to zero. Although the share of output going to bribes
converges to one, the real value of bribes declines as µt(1) nears one.
4.2 Subgame 2: Barrier to Adoption and No Barrier to Entry
We now turn to the second subgame, in which the government provides a barrier to the
adoption of superior technology and no barrier to the entry of unskilled workers in protected
industries.8
The results in the previous subsection relied upon the assumption that no unskilled
worked in protected industries. Hence, protection increased the skilled wage (before bribes)
relative to unskilled wages, and hence rents from protection were high. One might think
that the equilibrium level of protection would be reduced if unskilled workers could not be
excluded from working in a protected industry, as this limits the wage gap between skilled
and unskilled. While this intuition sometimes goes through, for some parameter values,
equilibria exist with extensive and protracted protection that are not possible when unskilled
workers are prohibited from working in protected industries. Moreover, if the government is
sufficiently corrupt, there are equilibria where all industries are protected in a given period,
which was not possible in the previous environment.
CPL equilibria of the type described in section 4.1.3 exist in this environment when
skilled workers are much more productive than unskilled (i.e. λ is large) and venality of
government (φ) is low. In this case, unskilled workers do not find it in their interest to
join protected industries and the analysis of section 4.1.3 applies directly. For parameters
8Note that this game contains several of the key elements of Parente and Prescott (1999). In particular,
the skill premium λ can be interpreted as the difference between the productivity of industry insiders pi1 and
industry outsiders pi0 in Parente and Prescott (1999).
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that generate CPL equilibria with higher µt(1) in the original environment, the counterparts
of these equilibria in the altered environment may feature lower levels of protection. The
possibility of unskilled workers joining a protected industry introduces an upper bound on
the skill premium, and thus lowers the value of protection.
The employment of unskilled in protected industries limits the distortions created by
protection. Ironically, this allows for equilibria where the economy is sometimes completely
closed (µt(0) = 0). In fact, for some parameter values, multi-period cycles featuring several
consecutive periods of non-adoption exist.
We begin our description of these cycles in the period t following zero protection.9 Then
the state in period t is as in section 4.1.1 – all skilled workers are in industries one vintage
behind. As in section 4.1.1, the price of unprotected goods is 1, the unskilled wage in
unprotected industries is wl,t(0) = γ
t, and the skilled wage in protected industries is ws,t(1) =
γt−1λpt(1). When unskilled workers work in protected industries, they receive the same
wage in protected and unprotected industries: wl,t(0) = wl,t(1) = ws,t(1)/λ. It follows that
pt(1) = γ. Equation (7) reduces to µt(1) (st(1) + lt(1)) + µt(0)lt(0) = 1. Since the value of
output is the same for all industries, yt/γ
t = lt(0) = λst(1) + lt(1). It follows that
lt(0) = 1 + µt(1) (λ− 1) st(1) (19)
and the government maximizes
UG(µt(1)) =
γt (1 + µt(1) (λ− 1) st(1)) + φBt(1)µt(1)
γµt(1)
. (20)
The value of protection is
V pt (1) = ws,t(1)− wl,t = γt (λ− 1) . (21)
Since UG is concave with respect to µt(1), an equilibrium features complete protection
in period t if and only if ∂U
G
∂µt(1)
|µt(1)=1, B=st(1)V pt (1) ≥ 0. This is equivalent to (1 + φ)(λ −
1)st(1)(1 − ln γ) ≥ ln γ. So long as ln γ < 1, a sufficiently venal government (high φ) will
protect all industries.
9A numerical example of this type of cycle is provided in 5.
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In the period following full protection (t+1), all old are distributed evenly across protected
industries, which are now two vintages behind the frontier: xt+1(2) = 1, st+1(2) =
1
2+n
.
This situation is the same as described above, with the frontier technology being γ2 more
productive than the incumbent (simply replace γ with γ2). Hence, if 2 ln γ < 1, a sufficiently
venal government would protect all industries for the second period in the row. This could
continue for up to N − 1 periods, where N ln γ ≥ 1 > (N − 1) ln γ. However, in the example
we construct in the next section, this continues for N − 2 periods (where N = 4). In period
t+N − 1, roughly half the industries are protected. In this period, all of the young work in
the unprotected industries, and the demand for unskilled workers in protected industries is
satisfied by old workers whose industries are not protected. Since the young are concentrated
in roughly half the industries, they do not demand protection in the following period as
st+N(1) ≥ 1 (see section 4.1.1). Industries N vintages behind no longer have any skilled
workers. Hence, the economy is completely open in period t + N , the young spread evenly
across the industries, and the cycle is ready to repeat itself.
4.3 Which Subgame Would the Government Choose?
We are now in a position to evaluate which of the two subgames the government would
choose. The answer to this question has important implications for how we should view the
Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) assumption of only barriers to adoption and no barriers
to entry matter for the costs of vested interests.
We find that the government chooses the subgame with entry barriers. While we cannot
establish this result analytically, we were unable to construct a single example where the
government chooses to offer only barriers to adoption and not restrict entry by outsiders in
the dynamic game.
To verify this finding, we undertook a grid search over parameter values in the static
game. Note that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a dynamic equilibrium is that,
given some initial condition s, the government would choose the subgame without entry
barriers. The grid search exercise involves comparing the value of the government objective
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in equilibria of subgames with and without entry of unskilled for various parameters and
initial conditions.
We consider the following ranges for the parameter values: φ ∈ [0, 20], γ ∈ [1.1, 1.5], λ ∈
[1.05, γ). We conjecture that the government in the preceding period chose the subgame
with entry barriers. In that case insiders exist only in industries one vintage behind. For
simplicity, we vary only the density of skilled workers in these industries, s(1) ∈ [0.05, 0.95],
and let the government protect up to measure 1 of them.
We find, for all (interesting) parameter values and all plausible initial conditions, that the
government objective is higher in the equilibrium of the subgame with no entry of unskilled.
The only exceptions in this static setup arise when λ is close to γ (barriers are not very
distortionary) and s(1) is very high (greater than 0.8). However, in all of these cases, the
static counter-examples violate dynamic equilibrium conditions, and hence cannot be part
of a dynamic equilibrium.10
To summarize we have found none of these equilibria where government would chose to
let unskilled enter.
The intuition for this result is natural, but not obvious. On the one hand, the ability of
outsiders to enter an industry where adoption of new technology is prohibited reduces the
rents available to insiders and thus lowers the value of protection. This in turn leads to lower
bribe offers to the government, which reduces their incentive to provide barriers to adoption.
This effect is offset by the fact that barriers have a smaller adverse effect on real GDP when
outsiders can enter a protected industry. On balance, however, the reduction in the value of
protection dominates, so that the government prefers to play the subgame where they trade
10When evaluating the static examples, we assumed unlimited demand (x(1) = 1), which cannot be the
case when s(1) > 0.8. In every counterexample, the government chose to protect measure 1 of industries.
Besides from violating the dynamic constraint, we overstate the
of industries. However, when s(1) is that high, there cannot be many industries that demand protection.
Thus, by evaluating the government’s objective at µ(1) = 1, we overstate the value of no-entry-barrier
subgame to the government for two reasons: 1) we let them collect from more lobbies than are out there; 2)
if the government grants protection to all who ask, the bribe falls below the value of protection.
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barriers to adoption and a prohibition on entry by outsiders for contributions (bribes) from
vested interests.
5 Discussion and Illustrative Example
The characterization of equilibria above suggests that barriers to entry and barriers to tech-
nology adoption are likely to be complementary outcomes of a political economy game. We
view this result as contributing towards the theoretical underpinnings for the quantitative
work of papers such as Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005b), which explore the implications of
barriers to entry and adoption for cross-country income differences.
The finding that barriers to adoption and entry would be jointly chosen by a government
may seem to suggest that limiting the ability of governments to limit entry would lead to
less barriers to the adoption of superior technology. To explore this argument, we can use
our characterization of the two subgames to see what would happen if governments were
prohibited from limiting entry into any industry.
It turns out that the intuition that prohibiting restriction of entry should lead to fewer
barriers to adoption holds for governments which are not too “corrupt”. Indeed, for the
benchmark parameter values of Bridgman, Livshits and MacGee [2005], if the government is
prohibited from providing barriers to the entry of unskilled workers into protected industries,
then the equilibrium outcome features all industries adopting the frontier technology (zero
protection). Thus, for some parameter values, barriers to entry turn out to be essential for
barriers to technology adoption.
This finding, however, is not robust to variations in parameter values. Indeed, for very
bad governments (ones with large values of φ), this result is dramatically reversed. When
barriers to entry are permitted, these parameters lead to (relatively) modest levels of short
lived protection. However, if governments cannot provide barriers to entry, then with the
relaxation of monopoly rights to labor supply they can generate several periods of non-
adoption of new technologies in all industries. This leads to large gaps between the level
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of TFP and the world technology frontier. These large TFP gaps cannot be generated
in a world with monopoly rights. Hence, relaxing monopoly rights can sometimes lead to
extremely perverse outcomes.
This reversal is driven by two underlying forces. First, since protected industries employ
(young) unskilled workers, the distortion in relative prices caused by protection is reduced.
This is due both to an expansion in output of protected industries and a reduction in the
output of unprotected industries. Recall that in the environment with monopoly rights, full
protection could never be an equilibrium outcome. As the fraction of industries protected
approaches one, all of the young workers are “crammed” into increasingly few industries.
This “cramming” effect does not occur in the absence of monopoly rights.
The second underlying force is a dynamic one. Prolonged protection requires the perpetu-
ation of industry lobby groups across generations. Since in the monopoly rights environment,
young workers do not work in protected industries, protection is never demanded by indus-
tries more than 1 vintage behind the technology frontier. In contrast, in the environment
without monopoly rights, we find equilibria where young work in protected industries. This
leads to a perpetuation of the industry lobby into the following period.
To help illustrate these arguments, consider the following illustrative example. Given our
demographic structure, we assume that each period corresponds to 20 years. We abstract
from population growth (n = 0). The technology growth factor is set to γ = 1.42, which
corresponds to a 1.8% annual growth rate. λ = 1.25, which implies that skilled workers
are 25% more productive then unskilled workers. The venality of government (φ) is 0.75,
which implies that the government values its own consumption 1.75 times as much as the
consumption of others. In all equilibria we analyze, the discount factor is irrelevant since
all members of the same generation have the same net income and intergenerational trade
is impossible. For simplicity, we set β = 1.
With these parameter values, the stationary equilibrium of the monopoly rights economy
is a constant protection equilibrium. Each period, 27.5% of industries are protected. The
resulting reduction in real GDP due to this protection is roughly 5.5%. For the same parame-
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ter values, the environment without monopoly rights generates no protection in equilibrium.
This confirms the basic intuition that limiting the value of protection should lead to lower
levels of protection.
This result, however, is reversed for high values of government venality. Increasing φ to
18 generates a two period cycle in the monopoly rights environment. This cycle features
alternating periods of complete openness and partial adoption, when 50.2% of industries are
protected. The reduction in real GDP in periods of partial protection is 18.8%. Both the
extent and longevity of protection are much higher when insiders do not have monopoly
rights on labor supply. The equilibrium in this environment is a four period cycle which
features 2 periods of complete protection, which leads to a drop in real GDP relative to the
frontier of a factor of 2.11 In the third period of the cycle, 53% of industries are protected,
while the remaining industries adopt frontier technologies. In the last period of the cycle,
protection is not demanded so all industries adopt best practice technologies.
What should we take from this example? Clearly, this example relies upon the assump-
tions of linearity of production and overlapping generations structure. Despite the stylized
nature of the model, we view this example as suggesting two important points. First, this
example provides an example where increased competition is not sufficient to remove bar-
riers. This suggests an important caveat to the argument of Holmes and Schmitz (1995)
that increased competition will lead to reduced incentives for the provision of barriers to
adoption. A related message is that even in cases where entry cannot be easily prohibited
(such as in the informal sector in developing countries) if local governance institutions are
very bad, one may still observe barriers to technology adoption.
11This goes a long way in accounting for measured differences between rich and poor countries, which vary
by roughly a factor of three (see Parente and Prescott (2000), page 80).
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we asked what the political economy outcome would be if a government regula-
tor was able to chose between providing barriers to the adoption of superior technology with
or without a barrier to the entry of industry outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, when-
ever barriers to the adoption of superior technology is an equilibrium outcome, governments
would prefer to provide both types of barriers to industry insiders’. However, we also find
that barriers to entry are not always essential for barriers to technology adoption to arise
in equilibrium. When governments are not too “bad”, restrictions on monopoly rights can
lead to the elimination of barriers to technology adoption. However, for “bad” governments,
restrictions on monopoly rights can lead to more extreme barriers to the adoption of superior
technologies and much larger deviations in TFP from the technology frontier.
The key driving force behind these surprising results is the endogenous dynamics of the
formation of vested interests. Having young workers acquire skills in obsolete technologies
perpetuates insider groups who have a vested interest in industries whose productivity is
falling further and further behind the frontier. This, combined with lower relative price
distortions, can (surprisingly) generate much larger and long-lived barriers to technology
adoption than are possible in an environment with monopoly rights.
We view our findings as suggesting that the costs of monopoly rights may be even larger
than those suggested by Parente and Prescott (1999) or Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005b).
However, our results also suggest that further work on the interaction between monopoly
rights and the dynamic evolution of interest groups may be worthwhile. While the stylized
nature of our model contributes to the large effect of barriers to entry on the evolution of
industry insiders, we view our findings as suggesting that further work may yield useful
insights.
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